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I\' 
COMES NOW, Petitioner/Plaintiff, ACI NORTH\VEST, INC., an Idaho corporation 
(hereinafter "ACI") by and through its attorneys, L\MES, VER.NON & \VEEKS, PA, and 
hereby presents Appellant's Brief. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This case arises from a Kootenai County development called Monument Heights. The 
developer, Monument Heights, LLC, failed to fully pay ACI for materials and services ACI 
supplied to the LLC for the development on a mountainside, south of Post Falls, Idaho. ACI 
filed and recorded mechanic's and materialman's liens. Monument Heights, LLC, subsequent to 
ACI's commencement of construction, borrowed sums from private lenders Dan S. Jacobsen, 
Sage Holdings, LLC, Steven G. Lazar, the Mitchell A. Martin and Karen C. Martin Family Trust 
Dated August 9, 2005, Devon Chapman, and HLT Real Estate, LLC (collectively referred to as 
"Jacobsen"). Jacobsen did not obtain release of lien rights from ACI at the date of the loan and 
recording of the security documents. Monument Heights, LLC sold portions of the property 
before and after ACI began construction. Portions of sold property were benefited by ACI' s 
materials and services. ACI sought lien foreclosure, and this appeal arises from the district 
court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment which relied on ParkWest Homes, LLC v. 
Barnson, 294 P.3d 1125 (Idaho 2013) (superseded and replaced at 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18 
(2013)). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
On August 10, 2009, ACI (Plaintiff in CV-2009-6398) timely initiated the judicial 
foreclosure of its Claim of Lien. 
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On June 4, 2010, the Honorable Lansing Haynes stayed the subject trustee's sale. 
On July 30, 2010, CV-2009-6398 was consolidated into this case. R. page 6. 
On January 12, 2012, ACI filed an Amended Complaint in this action seeking to 
judicially foreclose its mechanic's liens. R. page 28. 
On April 5, 2013, the district court granted Jacobsen's and Monument Heights, LLC's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against ACI holding that ACI's liens were lost and 
unenforceable as to the unnamed trustees of the deeds of trust. R. pages 117-127. 
On April 23, 2013, Jacobsen and Monument Heights, LLC filed the Motion to Vacate 
Stay of the Trustee's Sale ordered June 4, 2010. On May 14, 2013, oral argument was heard on 
Jacobsen and Monument Heights, LLC's motion and the motion was granted. R. page 39. 
On May 17, 2013, ACI's Motion for a Rule 54(b) Certificate was granted. R. pages 40, 
212-14. 
On June 7, 2013, ACI filed its Notice of Appeal of the April 5, 2013, order granting 
Jacobsen and Monument Heights, LLC's Partial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R. 
pages 40, 227-34. 
On June 13, 2013, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Oder Granting 
Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's Sale. 
C. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
This case involves a development known as Monument Heights on Blossom Mountain in 
Kootenai County. The developer, Monument Heights, LLC, planned to develop prestige acreage 
lots across the Spokane River and up the mountainside from the City of Post Falls. Monument 
Heights was expected to have expansive views to the north, including the City of Post Falls and 
most of the Rathdrum Prairie and the mountains beyond. 
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Daniel D. Harris and Jody L. Harris bought property adjacent to the Monument Heights 
development from Monument Heights, LLC. The roadway which is the subject of this litigation 
services the Harris property in addition to the Monument Heights development. Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris are not involved in this appeal. 
On May 27, 2008, ACI commenced furnishing materials and services in the construction 
of a roadway and other improvements. The building of the road became a far more arduous task 
than originally anticipated. Blasting, substantial hauling and heavy equipment work was 
necessary due to a rock outcropping on a parcel. ACI was the general contractor for the project; 
however, Monument Heights, LLC hired a separate blasting contractor, Keith A. Sims, dba 
Kasco of Idaho, LLC ("Kasco"). Kasco is a party to the lower court litigation but not a party to 
this appeal. 
The development faced challenges. The project was started late in the economic cycle 
and Monument Heights, LLC was inadequately capitalized for the difficulties that arose. 
Monument Heights, LLC also faced high financing expenses since it was forced to borrow from 
private lenders. 
On August 1, 2008, over a month after construction had been commenced by ACL 
Monument Heights, LLC executed and delivered the Jacobsen loan documents. The Deed of 
Trust was subsequently recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 6, 2008 as 
Instrument 2172582000 ("Monument Heights Deed of Trust"). R. pages 66-70. 
On January 29, 2009, following Monument Heights, LLC's failure to stay current with 
payments to ACI, ACI caused a mechanic's lien to be recorded with the Kootenai County 
Recorder as Instrument No. 2194504000. R. pages 166-68. 
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On July 28, 2009, ACI recorded an Endorsement to Claim of Lien for Payment on 
Account, as Instrument No. 2224601000. The Endorsement stated that a payment on account 
was received from Monument Heights, LLC on February 1 L 2009, in the amount of $25,000.00. 
R. pages 170-71. 
On August 10, 2009, ACI initiated these proceedings, CV-2009-6398, seeking judicial 
foreclosure of its Claim of Lien. On June 4, 2010, the Honorable Lansing Haynes stayed the 
subject trustee's sale. 
On January 20, 2010, Charles R. Dean, Jr. was appointed as the Successor Trustee under 
the Monument Heights Deed of Trust. At all times since that date, Mr. Dean has remained the 
Trustee. R. pages 80-82. 
On or about March 11, 2011, Monument Heights, LLC sold a portion of the real property 
subject to the ACI lien, the original house and surrounding acreage, to Defendants Anthony L. 
St. Louis and Andrea J. Stephens. Anthony L. St. Louis and Andrea J. Stephens did not borrow 
the funds to purchase from a traditional lender. Instead, after making a down payment they 
borrowed the balance from Monument Heights, LLC. Anthony St. Louis and Andrea Stephens 
executed and delivered to Monument Heights, LLC a Deed of Trust ("St. Louis/Stephens Deed 
of Trust"). Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County, Inc. was appointed the Trustee under the 
St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust. At all times since that date, Pioneer Title Company has 
remained the Trustee. Anthony L. St. Louis and A,.ndrea J. Stephens are not involved in this 
appeal. R. pages 59-62, 
On March 15, 2011, Monument Heights, LLC sold the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust 
and note to Lilly Properties, Inc. ("Lilly"), a Nevada corporation, as evidenced by an Assignment 
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of Secured Note & Deed of Trust recorded as Instrument 2306230000. Lilly is not involved in 
this appeal. R. pages 7 5-77. 
ACI, in accordance with two separately issued litigation guarantees, has never named the 
Trustee on the deeds of trust in the judicial foreclosure of the mechanic liens. 
On June 14, 2011, ACI, at the request of Monument Heights, LLC, re-commenced 
furnishing materials and services for the development. ACI invoiced Monument Heights, LLC 
the sum of $47,658.65 for this additional work. R. page 1 77. 
On July 26, 2011, ACI recorded a second mechanic's lien with the Kootenai County 
Recorder as Instrument No. 2321390000 securing the principal sum of $462,780.46, for the total 
unpaid balance for all of ACI's materials and service since commencing work on May 27, 2008. 
R. pages 177-87. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Should ParkWest Homes, L.L.C v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18 (2013), 
Be Modified or Reversed? 
2. Did the district court err in requiring that a trustee be named in a lien or in a suit to 
foreclose a lien under the Trust Deed statute, LC.§ 45-1502, et seq.? 
3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment based upon ParkWest Homes, 
L.L.C. v. Barnson, 294 P.3d 1125, (Idaho 2013), in that the facts of that case are 
distinguishable from the facts of the present case? 
4. Did the district court err in failing to construe the Idaho lien statutes, I.C. § 45-501, 
et seq., liberally in favor of the lien holder because the lien holder substantially 
complied, in good faith, with the statutory requirements for a mechanic's lien? 
5. Does the district court's ruling require clarification as to whether its outcome is 1) 
that ACI's lien is lost and unenforceable solely against the interest held by the trustee 
of the deed of trust, or 2) that the deed of trust is superior in priority to ACI's 
mechanics lien? 
6. Is application of the Park West holding to this case (the idea that a subsequent transfer 
of the property pursuant to the trust instrument will result in the transferee taking the 
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property free and clear of ACI's lien) at odds with general rules of trust law and Idaho 
Statute because ACI's Mechanics Lien is Superior to the Deeds of Trust as 
Instruments? 
7. Should ACI be awarded its attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to l.C. § 12-120(3) 
providing for attorney's fees in commercial transactions and LC.§ 45-513 providing 
for attorney's fees in an action on a mechanic's or materialman's lien? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court set forth the standard of review in Park West Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 154 
Idaho 678, 302 P.3d 18 (2013), as follows: 
An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district 
court uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. A & J Const. Co., Inc. 
v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). Under Rule 56(c) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." If the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. 
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 
(1996). In making this determination, "all disputed facts are liberally construed in 
favor of the non-moving party." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 
360, 364 (1991 ). Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material 
fact. Id. Inferences that can reasonably be made from the record are made in favor 
of the non-moving party. Id. However, the non-moving party may not rest on a 
mere scintilla of evidence. Id If the record raises neither a question of witness 
credibility nor requires weighing the evidence, then summary judgment should be 
granted. Merrill v. Dujjy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 
(1960). "The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party 
fails to make a shov,ing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case .... " Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 
126, 127 (1988). 
Id, 154 Idaho at 682,302 P.3d at 22. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Park West Homes, L.L.C. v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18 (2013), 
Should be Modified or Reversed. 
Idaho case law describing the nature of a deed of trust is not in line with the practical 
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reality of what the Idaho real estate bar, lending industry, construction industry and the title 
industry use every day as a security instrument on a vast majority of all real estate loans. Cases 
including ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson have created confusion and uncertainty and are 
leading toward expensive and unexpected results of increasing litigation and endangering the use 
of deeds of trust. 
ACI encourages the Court to use this opportunity to clarify what is conveyed to a trustee 
in a deed of trust. The need for clarification flows from the analyses of the trustee's "legal title" 
and the "power of sale" in the cases of Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P2d 1048 (1983), 
and Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222 (1999), which led to this 
Court's recent decision in ParkWest Homes. LL. C v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 302 P.3d 18 
(Idaho 2013 ). 
1. What is the Nature of a Deed of Trust? 
Part of the confusion surrounding a deed of trust emanates from its name. The name of 
the document as a "deed of trust" or "trust deed" makes little sense given its statutory purpose 
and usage. One California court stated: "Just as a panda is not a true bear, a trustee of a deed of 
trust is not a true trustee." Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, 196 Cal.App.3d 948,955, 
242 Cal.Rptr. 251) (1987). 
The reality is that a "deed" of "trust" is not a deed in the sense of a warranty or quitclaim 
deed and is not a trust document in the sense of a trust corpus managed and held by a trustee for 
the benefit of the beneficiary. Instead, it is a statutory creation adopted at the behest of the 
lending industry to avoid a cumbersome foreclosure process. See Roos v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 
477,321 P.2d 210,211 (1958) (discussing the lack of foreclosure requirement for deeds of trust). 
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In Long v. Williams, l 05 Idaho 585, 671 P .2d 1048 (1983), a debtor in bankruptcy argued 
that the execution of a deed of trust encumbering his real property divested him of the title to the 
real property wh justified excluding the encumbered real property from the bankruptcy estate~ 
The Supreme Court disagreed: 
[T]he deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale, 
capable of exercise upon the occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default 
in payment) and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of 
o\vnership which passes to the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of bankruptcy. 
Id at 586,671 P.2d at 1049. The Court further described the trustee's interest under a deed of 
trust as "for practical purposes, only a mortgage with power of sale." Id at 588, 671 P.2d at 
1051. 
The Court relied on Bank of Ita(y Nat. Trust & Sar. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644,654, 
20 P.2d 940, 944 (1933), for the notion that a trust deed is like a mortgage with a power of sale. 
This California case is the bulwark for the holding that a deed of trust trustee cannot "hold a 
mere 'lien' on the property" because the deed of trust is a "mortgage with power of sale." Id at 
656, 20 P.2d at 944. The California Court relies on a California statute to conclude that the legal 
title conveyed is nothing more than a security interest. Id. The California court goes to great 
effort to limit the scope of the conveyance to assure that the grantor/trustor in the deed of trust 
"is treated by our law as the holder of the legal title,'' with "a right of possession" and has a 
"valid claim of homestead.'' Id. at 656-657, 20 P.2d at 940. 
One case relied on by the California court is an Idaho case. "In Idaho, a state that has 
adopted nearly all of our Code sections on security transactions, it has been held that a deed of 
trust is a mortgage with pov.1er o_f sale." Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 
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Cal. at 654, 20 P.2d 940 (citing Brown v. Bryan, 5 Idaho 145, 51 P. 995 (1896)) (emphasis 
added). 
In 1896 the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Bryan, 5 Idaho 145, 51 P. 995 (1896) 
that 
[a] trust deed executed to secure a given debt, payable at a specified time, upon 
real estate, is, under the statutes of Idaho a mortgage, and cannot be foreclosed by 
notice and sale, under a power of sale in such trust deed; and such trust deed can 
only be foreclosed by judicial sale, pursuant to decree rendered in an action 
brought therefor in the proper court. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
The Bank of Italy v. Bentley court's reliance on Brown v. Bryan for the proposition that a 
deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of sale is misplaced because Broivn v. Bryan held that a 
deed of trust required judicial foreclosure. The Idaho Trust Deed Act would not be enacted for 
another sixty years following Brown v. Bryan. It is unfortunate that the Idaho Supreme Court 
relied exclusively on Bank of Italy v. Bentley for its decision in Long, especially considering that 
Bank of Italy misconstrued Idaho law. 
In 1989, the Court noted that the enactment of the Idaho Trust Deed Act effectively 
overruled Brown v. Bryan. Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 115 Idaho 739, 741, 769 P.2d 1111, 1113 
(1989), observing: 
At the end of the last century, this Court refused to enforce a power of sale clause, 
holding that an instrument termed as a deed of trust must be treated as a mortgage 
under the then-existing statutes. , , , 
The case of Bro-wn v. B1yan, is distinguishable. The then-existing 
legislative enactments did not include the Idaho Trust Deeds Act, LC.§§ 45-1502 
et seq. This act sets forth in detail the procedures which must be followed in 
foreclosures of deeds of trust, and effectively overruled Brown v. B1yan. \ilhen 
the legislature first enacted these laws in 1957, and in its subsequent amendments, 
it made the act applicable only to deeds of trust. Because the legislature has 
created a separate scheme for deeds of trust, the rationale for Brown v. Bryan, 
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that mortgages and deeds of trust are functional equivalents, is undercut. The 
legislature obviously intended separate treatment: therefore, they are not 
functionally the same. 
Id. at 740-41, 769 P.2d at 1112-13 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Long that "even though title passes for the purpose 
of the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale," 105 
Idaho at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51, is incorrect. This holding mischaracterizes the nature of a 
deed of trust and misled this Court in the ParkWest case. The Court in Frazier, six years later, 
put to rest the misguided notion that a trust deed and a mortgage are functionally the same; 
however, this Court persisted in later cases in likening a trust deed to a mortgage with a power of 
sale. 
A statutory deed of trust is not a "mortgage" and shares few characteristics with a 
mortgage. \Vhile both act to secure an obligation, usually a promissory note, ,vi.th real estate, a 
mortgage is a two-party agreement, and a deed of trust is a three-party agreement. A mortgage 
must be foreclosed by judicial action. I. C. § 6-101. A deed of trust is foreclosed through a non-
judicial sale unless the beneficiary chooses to foreclose as a mortgage. LC. § 45-1506. A 
mortgage has an equitable right of redemption. I. C. § 11-402. A deed of trust has no such 
redemption right. I.C. § 45-1508. A mortgage can be placed on any real property. I.C. § 45-
1001. A deed of trust is statutorily limited to certain properties based upon size and location. 
I.C. § 45-1502(5). A mortgage on real property is a lien. I.C. §§ 45-901, -903, and -906. A trust 
deed conveys "legal title" to the Trustee. I.C. § 45-1502(3). In Idaho, the phrase "a deed of trust 
is a mortgage with a power of sale" misconstrues the law and its simplicity leads to confusion 
and erroneous decisions. 
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Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar, I 32 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222, (1999), continues the 
confusion engendered by Long v. Williams. In Defendant A., an attorney tried to leverage one 
client to pay the bill of another client by refusing to deliver an original deed of trnst in his 
possession to the first client. Id at 664, P.2d at 224. Defendant A had little to do with the deed 
of trnst and could have involved any property wTongfully withheld by the attorney. Instead of 
limiting the scope of Defendant A. to wrongful withholding and attorney misconduct, the 
Supreme Court in dictum launched into an analysis of deeds of trnsts as "deeds," and then as 
"trnsts," and finally as "mortgages with the power of sale," perhaps to support the idea that the 
attorney was wrongfully withholding something of value to the first client. Id. 
In Defendant A., the Court does cite to the Trnst Deed Statute: LC.§§ 45-1513, 45-1202, 
and 45-1203 concerning the delivery of the deed and notes correctly that, "[a] deed oftrnst is a 
conveyance of real property. I.C. § 45-1513." Id at 664,978 P.2d at 224. However, the Court 
then described a deed of trnst as the functional equivalent of a deed, citing to state law which has 
nothing to do with deeds of trust created under the Trust Deed statute. Id at 664-665, 978 P.2d 
at 224-225. The Court unnecessarily analogized the Trust Deed to different types of documents 
overlooking its description in Long v. FVilliams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P2d 1048, 1049 (1983), 
that a "deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale, capable of exercise 
upon the occurrence of certain contingencies." 
This Court in ParkWest depa:ris from this minimal conveyance characterization in Long v. 
Williams and relies instead--erroneously as set forth above--on the language from Long 
equating a deed of trust with a mortgage: 
Idaho is a title theory state, whereby a deed of trust is a title-passing 
procedure. This Court extensively discussed this procedure in Long v. Williams. 
105 Idaho 585,587,671 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1983). We noted that a deed of trust is 
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effectively a mortgage with a power of sale, but as security for that mortgage, 
legal title passes to the trustee. Id. at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51. When a deed 
of trust is executed and delivered, the legal title of the property passes to the 
trustee. I.C. § 45-1502(4); Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar.132 Idaho 662,665, 
978 P.2d 222,225 (1999). 
ParkWest, 154 ldaho at 684,302 P.3d at 24. 
Not only is a deed of trust not a mortgage with a power of sale, this Court did not 
describe the nature or extent of the legal title that passes to the trustee of a deed of trust, but 
proceeded as if the trustee under the trust deed is the holder of substantial rights and incidents of 
ownership. In Long, however the Court described the nature of the trustor's and the trustee's 
title under a deed of trust: "[T]he deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power 
of sale ... and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of ownership .... " 
Long, 105 Idaho at 586,671 P.2d at 1049 (emphasis added). 
The practical aspects of a deed of trust are well knmvn in the real estate, title and lending 
industries. A deed of trust contains a grantor, a beneficiary and a trustee, so the concept of 
delivery of a document with only a grantor and grantee is very different from a three party 
security instrument. For example, the deed of trust is usually signed by the "grantor" (or 
"trustor") and recorded and then is usually "delivered" to someone other than the "grantee" ( or 
"trustee"). The deed of trust may be delivered to any number oflocations but usually to the 
beneficiary or purchaser for securitization. The trustee has little or no function-and certainly 
no duties-until and unless there is a default. Even then, the beneficiary often effects a 
substitution of trustee. The trustee may resign at any time. The trustee may not be aware of 
being named as a trustee. Statutorily, the trustee has no duty or right to manage the property and 
no right to sell the property until there is a default and statutory notice requirements have been 
met. 
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Despite legal title passing to the trustee, to say a deed of trust is a "deed" is incorrect 
because as a security device, a deed of trust is not the functional equivalent of a deed in modern 
real estate transactions. The statue implies that a deed of trust may be valttl without a receiver of 
the conveyance "[i]fa trustee is not appointed in the deed of trust." LC.§ 45-1504(2). Thus, the 
Court's analogizing a deed of trust to a deed in Defendant A. makes little sense. That statute says 
a deed of trust is a conveyance of real property, but it is a conveyance of nothing more than the 
right to act as an auctioneer, which may be a stick in the bundle of property rights; however, it is 
a stick that can be taken away at any time by the beneficiary. The "conveyance" described in the 
statute is a service to the beneficiary, not the enjoyment of real property rights by the trustee. 
2. What is the Nature of the Trust Deed Trustee's "Legal Title?" 
In the Trust Deed Statute, the words "convey"' and "reconvey" refer only to the power of 
sale in the event of default and the termination of the security device when the obligation is paid 
in full. The deed of trust conveys "title" to the trustee only so far as may be necessary for the 
execution of the trustee's duties. A trustee only has two duties with respect to the property: to 
sell the property in the event of a default in the obligation and to reconvey its interest in the 
property when the debt secured by the deed of trust is satisfied. 
If a deed of trust trustee is going to be considered a true O\Vner of the legal title to the 
property, then the trustee will be an indispensible party to all real property litigation including 
easement, landlord/ tenant, probate, subdivision, water rights and a myriad of other real estate 
litigation. It could also open the flood gates to a new form of litigation concerning breach of the 
trustee's duties. 
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In Idaho, the trustee on a deed of trust is not a typical party in real property litigation 
unless the litigation involves a trustee's sale or reconveyance. For example, if neighboring 
property owners whose properties are encumbered by a deed of trust have a boundary dispute; 
neither the trustees nor the beneficiaries under the deeds of trust are included as parties. By 
contrast, if one of the property owners is a trust, the trustee of the trust would be the proper party 
to the litigation. The "legal title" held by this kind of trustee is much more comprehensive than 
the legal title held by the trustee under a deed of trust. Not including deed of trust trustees in real 
property litigation seems to have served the courts and the trustees well and does not appear to 
be inconsistent with the spirit and the wording of the trust deed statute. To change this practice 
greatly increases cost and risks to the trustee. Several potential results of including deed of trust 
trustees in real property litigation include: ( 1) the costs of a deed of trust will increase 
dramatically, (2) people and entities will decline to serve as trustees, and (3) the trustees will 
become targets for breaching duties as the legal owner. 
A deed of trust is not a deed and is not a trust document: it is a statutorily created security 
device that does not fit neatly in the common law property distinctions largely because its 
purpose is to avoid the application of common law and the protection of debtors afforded at 
common law. Idaho Code 45-1502(3) speaks to "conveying real property" but also says that the 
conveyance is "in trust to secure the performance of an obligation." Idaho Code 45-1502(4) 
defines "Trustee" as the person "to whom the legal title is conveyed by the deed of trust." Legal 
title is never defined. The reality is that the "legal title" is solely the right to sell in the event of 
foreclosure. 
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3. Park West Incorrectly Expands the Nature of a Trustee's Legal Title. 
The limited position of the trustee as the beneficiary's auctioneer should not make the 
trustee a necessary party under LC. § 45-510. Section 45-510 does not identify necessary parties 
to the foreclosure action; however, the Court has held that if the "lienor fails to timely name a 
party-in-interest to the property in an action to enforce its lien, the lienor loses its lien with 
respect to the unnamed party's interest in the property." Hilary M. Saltman, Inspecting a Faulty 
Foundation in ParkWest Homes v. Bamson, The Advocate, Nov./Dec. 2013, at 29 (citing Willes 
v. Palmer, 78 ldaho 104,109,298 P.2d 972,975 (1956)). The question becomes whether the 
trustee under a deed of trust is a party-in-interest who requires notice of the lien foreclosure 
proceeding. Given the extremely limited nature of this kind of trustee's "legal title," it seems 
that no purpose would be served by including the trustee in the lien foreclosure litigation. While 
notice in real property transactions and litigation is a consideration, a mechanic's or 
materialman' s lien must be recorded. The recording gives notice to anyone concerned with the 
real property of the lien's existence. Including or not including the trustee of the deed of trust in 
the lien foreclosure action does not change that. 
This Court in ParkWest, however, "seems to assert that the trustee holds unqualified title 
to the property conveyed under a deed of trust." Soltman, supra. Further, the Court gave no 
weight to the language in Long that the trust deed trustee "held nothing more than the power of 
sale upon certain contingencies" while the grantor's interest "comprised of all other attributes of 
ownership" passed to the banJ,,..ruptcy trustee. Soltman, supra (citing Long, 105 Idaho at 588, 671 
P.2d at 1051). 
As mentioned above, the Court's expansive view of the nature of the trustee's legal title 
raises many quandaries. As stated by Ms. Saltman: 
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Perhaps the most troublesome implication of ParkWest II is its potential to 
complicate or impede real estate transactions. If a trustee is the legal title holder 
of the property, how should we approach any encumbrances junior to a deed of 
trust? Would the trustee need to consent to any junior encumbrances? Would the 
trustee need to be included in land use applications, as a signatory on plats, or 
involved in development agreements, easements, or any other documents 
requiring an owner's consent or execution? From the trustee's perspective, if a 
trustee must now consent to any of the documents, what duties would the trustee 
have to each of the parties to these transactions? 
Soltman, supra at 31. 
ACI respectfully contends that the Court should revisit ParkWest and should modify or 
overrule it. 
B. The District Court Erred in Requiring That a Trustee be Named in a Lien or 
in a Suit to Foreclose a Lien Because a "Trustee" Under the Trust Deed 
Statute, I.C. § 45-1502, et seq., Holds Such a Minimal Legal Title That a 
Trustee Need Not be Named in a Lien or in a Suit to Foreclose a Lien. 
The district court erred in requiring that a trust deed trustee be named in a mechanic's 
lien foreclosure because a trustee has extremely limited power under a deed of trust. A trust 
deed is defined as "a deed executed in conformity with this act and conveying real property to a 
trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or other person named in 
the deed to a beneficiary." LC.§ 45-1502(2) (emphasis added). A trustee is defined as a "person 
to whom legal title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in interest." Id. at 
(4). However, the "legal title" held by the trustee is extremely limited. Indeed, a deed of trust 
"conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale, capable of exercise upon the 
occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default in payment) and leaves in the trustor a legal 
estate comprised of all incidents of ownership." Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P.2d 
1048, 1049 (1983). The title held by the trustor is more significant than that held by the trustee, 
so requiring the trustee to be named in a material man's lien is unnecessary. For instance, a 
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trustor who has filed bankruptcy still has enough legal interest in property encumbered by a deed 
of trust to require him to subject that property to the bankruptcy estate, even though the trustee 
technically holds legal title to the property pursuant to the deed of trust. Id. This Court has 
described that legal title under a deed of trust as "nothing more than the power of sale upon 
certain contingencies." Id. In fact, this Court said in Long that a trustor also holds "legal interest 
in the property which [is] good against all persons except the [trustee,] which [holds] nothing 
more than the power of sale upon certain contingencies." Id. To use a familiar metaphor of 
property law, the trustee holds only one of many sticks in the bundle that comprises the total 
ownership rights in a particular piece of property. If the remaining sticks held by the truster are 
substantial enough to be subject to the bankruptcy system then they are certainly enough to be 
subjugated to a mechanic's lien. 
Furthermore, as a fiduciary owing duties to the beneficiary and the trust, the trustee may 
only exercise control over the trust property in limited circumstances, the most common 
circumstance being the default of the trustor. Thus, "even though title passes for the purpose of 
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage with power of sale." Id. at 
587-588, 671 P.2d at 1050-1051. 1 From the well known treatise on property law, the trustee's 
role in a deed of trust is described: 
The trustee ( designated by the lender in most states) holds a limited legal title to 
the property for the purpose of enforcing the lender's security interest. In the 
event the trustor/borrower defaults on the promissory note, the beneficiary/lender 
will notify the trustee and instruct the trustee to foreclose. The trustee will then 
initiate either a judicial foreclosure Gust as with a mortgage), or more often, the 
trustee will hold a private auction sale of the property. 
1 While ACI is critical of the phrase "mortgage with a power of sale," as being inaccurate and leading to confusion, 
the Court in Long correctly recognized the very limited nature of the trustee's legal title, which the Court in 
ParkWest failed to do. 
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11-94 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Editions§ 94.02 (emphasis added). From this 
description it is apparent that the trustee may only act when called upon by the beneficiary 
following the trustor' s default. 
In fact, this limited role of the trustee is built in to the deeds of trust in the instant case, 
the Monument Heights Deed of Trust and the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust. Each of these 
trust deeds makes the trustees' power to enforce the terms of the deeds subject to the option and 
request of the beneficiary, illustrating the limited role of the trustee in the instrument. In 
essence, the trustee is nothing more than the beneficiary's agent. The requirement to name such 
party in the filing of a mechanic's lien seems neither necessary nor prudent since the trustee 
cannot act with respect to the property without the authorization of the beneficiary. 
The Monument Heights Deed of Trust contains the following language evidencing the 
limited powers of the trustees: 
B. It is mutually agreed that: 
3. . .. upon written request of Beneficia,y . .. Trustee may: reconvey all or any part 
of said property; consent to the making of any map or plat thereof; join in 
granting any easement thereon, or join in any extension agreement or any 
agreement subordinating the lien or charge thereof. 
4. Upon written request of Beneficiary ... Trustee shall reconvey, ,vithout 
warranty, the property then held hereunder ... 
6. . . .In the event of default Beneficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to 
execute a ,vritten notice of such default and of his election to cause to be sold the 
herein described property. . . . 
Monument Heights Deed of Trust R. page 68 (Instrument No. 2172582000, emphasis added). 
The St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust contains almost identical language evidencing the limited 
power and role of the trustee. See St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust, R. page 72 (Instrument No. 
2035938000). Thus, not only is the trustee's power and role limited in general, the specific 
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deeds at issue grant the power of the trustee to act to the beneficiary and the trustee can only act 
at the beneficiary's request. 
C. Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment Based Upon 
Park West Homes, L.L.C. v. Barnson, 294 P.3d 1125, (Idaho 2013), in That the 
Facts of That Case are Distinguishable From the Facts of the Present Case? 
In ParkWest Homes, a trustee's sale had occurred. In fact, it was the buyer who 
intervened and argued that it took the property free and clear of the mechanic's lien. In the 
present case there is nothing in the record to indicate a sale has occurred. The sale was formally 
stayed until after the summary judgment. Without a sale of the encumbered property there is no 
real question as to whose rights to the encumbered property prevail, because the trustees' interest 
is merely a power of sale, subject to the superior rights of the beneficiary of the deed of trust and 
subject to the lien rights of ACI. 
In ParkWest the property encumbered by the mechanic's lien was foreclosed by First 
American through a trustee's sale and then conveyed to Residential through a Trustee's deed. 
ParkWest, 154 Idaho at 681,302 P.3d at 21. As a result of the trustee's sale, Residential 
maintained that it took the property free and clear of Park West's lien. Id. Consequently, the 
issue addressed by this Court was: 
[W]hether a lienor seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against property 
encumbered by a deed of trust must name the trustee of the deed of trust within 
the period of time required by statute to give effect to the mechanic's lien against 
subsequent holders of legal title. 
Id. at 682, 302 P .3d at 22 ( emphasis added). This Court ultimately held: 
[B]ecause a mechanic's lien is lost as to any interest in property not named in a 
foreclosure action, we hold that a subsequent holder of legal title to property 
encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien, takes the property free and 
clear of the mechanic's lien, where the lienor fails to name the trustee of the deed 
of trust in an action to enforce the mechanic's lien within the period of time 
required by statute. 
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Id. at 685, 302 P.3d at 25 (emphasis added). Present in both the issue addressed by this Court 
and this Court's holding, is the factual scenario of the lien being rendered lost and unenforceable 
as to a subsequent purchaser of the encumbered property. However, in this case there is not a 
subsequent purchaser, and therefore, the holding of ParkWest should not apply to this case. 
Similarly, the holding does not apply to the facts of ACI's liens because there was no 
"subsequent holder oflegal title to property" as in ParkWest because there has been no trustee's 
sale, only appointment of successor trustees. 
This importance of this distinction becomes clear when ACI' s remaining rights pursuant 
to its mechanics lien are exercised. Assuming that the district court judge's determination that 
ACI's lien is not lost and can be foreclosed but is subject to the trustees' interest under the deeds 
of trust- merely a power to sell - then ACI forecloses under its mechanics lien, the property is 
sold subject to the trustee's power to sell. Practically speaking, ACI will have priority over the 
beneficiary and the grantor on the deed of trust so when the interest is sold at sheriffs sale and 
ACI bids its judgment credit, ACI takes over the position of the grantor and beneficiary and 
simply has the trustee reconvey the power of sale to ACI. This convoluted procedure could be 
avoided by just the Court's recognizing that the trustee has nothing but a power of sale which is 
dependent upon the grantor and beneficiary so that when a lien has priority over a deed of trust 
through the grantor and the beneficiary, the named defendants, the lien has priority over the 
trustee as well. This procedure is consistent with the reality that the trustee is nothing more than 
the agent of the beneficiary for the purpose of sale. The statute speaks to conveyance, but the 
conveyance is limited to the power of sale and it is controlled by the beneficiary. A foreclosure 
of the interest of the beneficiary and the grantor is the foreclosure of the trustee's interest under 
the deed of trust. ACI will be able to foreclose on its mechanic's lien just as if the judge 
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determined that the mechanic's lien had priority to the interests of the trustees under the deed of 
trust. 
Necessary to this Court's decision in ParkWest was the equitable principle that a good 
faith purchaser should prevail against the mistake of a seller or related party, and when title is in 
dispute the title goes in favor of the good faith purchaser. \Vhile this concern was never 
explicitly discussed by this Court, it seems apparent that it was an important factor. For instance, 
the equitable considerations relating to bona fide purchasers are well established in property 
law.2 A bona fide purchaser is "one who has in good faith paid valuable consideration for 
property without notice of prior adverse claims." Black's Law Dictionary 1355 (Bryan A. 
Gamer ed., 9th ed., West 2009). Because of the good faith of the purchaser and equitable 
considerations "generally, a bona fide purchaser for value is not affected by the transferor's fraud 
against a third party and has a superior right to the transferred property." Id. Thus, the courts are 
willing to determine title to property based on the good faith of the purchaser and equitable 
principles. 
D. The District Court Erred in Failing to Construe the Idaho Lien Statutes, LC. 
§ 45-501, et seq., Liberally in Favor of the Lien Holder Because the Lien 
Holder Substantially Complied, in Good Faith, With the Statutory 
Requirements For a Mechanic's Lien. 
The district court erred in holding that ACI's mechanic's liens are lost and unenforceable 
against the Monument Heights Deed of Trust and the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust because 
these liens were filed in good faith and in substantial compliance with LC. § 45-501, et seq., and 
2 ACI is not arguing that Residential was a good faith purchaser, but is drawing a parallel between the equitable 
treatment of bona fide purchasers and this Court's holding that Residential got free and clear title to the encumbered 
property because the trustee was not named in the foreclosure action, which appears to have some equitable 
reasoning. 
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should therefore be construed liberally in favor of ACI. The statute governing the contents of a 
materialman's lien requires the following: 
(a) A statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets; 
(b) The name of the owner, or reputed owner, if known; 
( c) The name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished 
the materials; and 
( d) A description of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for 
identification. 
l.C. § 45-507(3). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when considering a lien's 
statutory compliance the statutes must be liberally construed in the lien holder's favor: 
In considering a contention challenging the sufficiency of compliance with 
statutory requisites, it should be kept in mind that a substantial compliance in 
good faith meets such requirement; that the provisions of our lien statutes must be 
liberally construed in favor of the claimant with a view to effect their object and 
promote justice. 
Layrite Prods. Co. v. Lux, 86 Idaho 477, 483-484, 388 P.2d 105, 109 (1964); see also Turnboo v. 
Keele, 86 ldaho 101, 383 P.2d 591 (1963); Dybvig v. Willis, 59 Idaho 160, 82 P.2d 95 (1938), 
Phillips v. Salmon River A1in. & Development Co., 9 Idaho 149, 72 P. 886 (1903). 
The language of the mechanic lien statute's requirement of "[t]he name of the owner, or 
reputed owner, if known" should be an indication that a hypertechnical standard is not required in 
filing a mechanic's lien. I.C. § 45-507(3)(a) (emphasis added). For instance, when a mechanic's 
lien was mistakenly filed against a lessee instead of the record ovmer of the property the Court 
did not hold that mistake fatal. Gem State Lbr. Co. v. Union G. & E. Co., 47 Idaho 747, 749-
750, 278 P. 775, 776 (1929). In that case, the failure to name the record ov.ner of the property 
was not fatal to the lien because the record ov.ner "was in no manner misled by the mistake, but 
had been apprised of the lien claim and knew all about it long prior to the institution of the suit." 
Id. at 749. Looking to the facts of that case, it is instructive that failure to name the sole party 
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with title to the property did not render the lien lost or unenforceable. A lessee has absolutely no 
legal claim to title in leased property, but naming a lessee as owner of encumbered property did 
not cause the lien to be lost or unenforceable. In that case, the Court construed the requirements 
of the statute liberally and in favor of the lien holder, validating the lien because of the 
substantial compliance and good faith of the lien holder. 
Similarly, years later the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of Gem State, when it 
proclaimed: 
This Court, in Gem State Lumber Co. v. Union Grain & Elevator Co., 4 7 Idaho 
747, 278 P. 775, 776, upon invoking the rule of liberal construction of the lien 
law, held that failure to state the name of the record owner of the property in the 
claim of lien, was not fatal since it appeared that such owner "was in no manner 
misled by the mistake, but had been apprised of the lien claim." 
Manley v. MacFarland, 80 Idaho 312, 322-323, 327 P.2d 758, 764 (1958). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has continually held that failure to name a particular party in a claim of mechanic's lien is 
not fatal if the lien is filed in good.faith and the record owner is not misled by the mistake. In the 
Manley case, the Court was asked to follow Willes v, Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 P.2d 972 
(1956), which the current Supreme Court relied on for its holding in ParkWest, for the 
proposition that a lien filed against only one owner of jointly held community property is invalid 
because it fails to name all parties with title. Id. at 322, 327 P.2d at 764. The Manley Court 
correctly refused to follow that interpretation of Willes and stated "[t]hat case does not support 
[that] contention; though it involved a claim of lien naming only the husband as the owner or 
reputed ovmer, this Court did not rule upon the validity of the claim." Id. Instead, the Manley 
Court upheld a lien with only one marital partner named because the omission did not result in 
any prejudice. Id. Thus, failure to name one party with an interest in property is excusable when 
construing the statute liberally in the favor of the lien holder if the lien was filed in good faith 
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and the omission does not result in any prejudice. 
Lest the principle of liberal construction in the favor of the lien holder is forgotten, in a 
similar case where a lien named only one of the reputed owners of community real property the 
Court upheld the lien despite the complete failure to name the title holding party. Layrite Prods. 
Co. v. Lux, 86 Idaho 477,483,388 P.2d 105, 108 (1964). Once again, the Court focused on 
"substantial compliance in good faith" and not on technicalities. Id. 
In this case, the statutory requirements were met in good faith with substantial 
compliance in each lien. The failure to include the trustee should not be a basis for the failure of 
the liens. If the complete omission of the sole record owner's name in the Gem State case was 
not fatal to the lien, then the omission of only the trustees to a deed of trust in this case should 
not be fatal either. ACI certainly complied with the statutory standard set forth in LC. § 45-507 
requiring "[t]he name of the owner, or reputed owner, if known." Furthermore, there is no 
surprise or prejudice to the unnamed parties in this case that would necessitate the failure of the 
liens. Thus, when viewing the materialman's lien statute liberally and in favor of the lien holder, 
ACI's materialman's liens substantially comply with the statutory requirements. 
E. Is the District Court's ruling on the Priority of ACI's Lien vis-a-vis the Trust 
Deeds Unclear? 
\Vhether the District Court decision applies only to the trustee or to the deed of trust as a 
whole is of paramount importance. If the deed of trust has priority, then the mechanics lien is 
not only junior it is essentially worthless, as it is highly unlikely that the property has any value 
in excess of that debt secured by the deed of trust. 
ACI filed a mechanic's lien for the services and the material provided to the project. The 
trustee may have been conveyed a limited title as described by ParkWest, but as analyzed above 
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the title appears to be nothing more than a power of sale or the reconveyance of the power to sell. 
If the trustee remains but the beneficiary and the grantor are foreclosed, then the lien remains 
worth foreclosing. ACI can purchase the beneficiary's position and terminate the trustee or 
reconvey to the grantor so that that the judgments can be paid. To hold that the deed of trust has 
priority is to say that the grantor and the beneficiary are protected even though they have 
properly been sued. 
As Ms. Saltman pointed out: 
Park West next argued that even if it lost its lien as to the trustee, its judgment lien 
against Ms. Bamson attached to her interest in the property prior to Residential's 
purchase of the property at the trustee's sale. The Court made quick work of this 
argument, explaining that the interest that Residential acquired from the trustee 
dated back to the interest conveyed to the trustee under the deed of trust, as 
opposed to the date of the sale. In doing so, the Court relied on Idaho Code 
Section 45-1506(10), which states: 
The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest in the 
property which the grantor had, or had the power lo convey. at the 
time of the execution by him of the trust deed together with any 
interest the grantor or his successors in interest acquired after the 
execution of such trust deed. 
Interestingly, this seemingly simple explanation exposed the problem with the 
Court's previous "title theory" analysis under Idaho's deed of trust statutes. Under 
Section 45-1506(10), the trustee under the deeds of trust conveyed to Residential 
the interest that Ms. Bamson had, or bad the power to convey, at the time she 
executed the MERS deeds of trust on November 14, 2006. However, the interest 
that Ms. Bamson held on November 14, 2006 was subject to any mechanics' lien 
rights of Park West relating back to its commencement of construction. If 
ParkWest's lien attached to Ms. Bamson's interest in the property prior to 
November 14, 2006, was deemed valid by ParkWest I, and was properly enforced 
against Ms. Bamson's interest in the property, how was Residential ultimately 
able to take better title than Ms. Barnson was ever able to convey to the trustee? 
This quandary was not resolved by the Court in ParkWest II. In its briefing 
on appeal, Residential argued that the foregoing interpretation of Section 45-
1506( 10) reads out of existence the requirement that a lienor must enforce its lien 
against a party-in-interest within six months of its claim of lien pursuant to 
Section 45-510. Residential's argument relies, as it must, on the Court's agreement 
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that the trustee is the legal title holder to the property ( otherwise the interest lost 
vis-a-vis the trustee would be negligible, as ParkWest believed). It is not the 
mechanics' lien statute, but the Court's expansive view of the nature of title held 
by the trustee -- and the complete loss of Park West's lien for failure to name that 
trustee -- that creates the conflict Residential identifies. However, this reasoning 
still ignores the fact that, in the end, the trustee only held and could only convey 
to Residential the interest it received from Ms. Barnson -- an interest that was 
subject to Park West's validly filed and properly enforced mechanic's lien. 
Soltman, supra at 30. 
Junior lien holders only get paid any remaining proceeds of the trustee's sale after the 
sale expenses and the obligations secured by the trust deed are paid off, LC. § 45-1507, 
essentially nothing in most cases. If the lien is merely lost and unenforceable as to the trustee's 
limited power to sell (as the order was worded), then the lien is still superior to the Deeds of 
Trust and the property at sale will remain encumbered by ACI's mechanic's lien. See 59A C.J.S. 
Mortgages § 838. 
The district court's summary judgment decision does not seem to hold that the deeds of 
trust have priority over ACI' s lien. Such a holding appears to be consistent with the application 
of Park West; however if that is not what the district court meant, then the decision should be 
reversed as moving beyond the scope of Idaho law. 
Jacobsen sought in the Motion for Summary Judgment Memorandum in Support, and at 
the Hearing the following: 
1. "Defendants ... move this Honorable Court for entry of summary judgment against 
Plaintiff. .. holding that [ACI's] claims of [sic] are lost and unenforceable against the 
deeds of trust recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder." Defendants· Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff AC! Northwest, Inc., 2 (February 26, 2013); R. 
page 43. 
2. "Plaintiffs Notice of Claim of Lien ... is lost and unenforceable against each of 
Defendants' deeds of trust." Memorandum in Support of Defendants ' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff AC! Northwest, Inc., 9 (February 26, 2013); R. 
page 53. 
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3. "[Defendants] requests entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff, ACI Northwest, 
Inc., on the basis that its mechanic's liens are lost and unenforceable against the 
Monument Heights Deed of Trust and St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust." Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants· _Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff, ACI 
Northwest, Inc., 9 (February 26, 2013); R. page 54. 
4. "We request that summary judgment be entered and hold that ACI's lien is lost and 
unenforceable against the title that the trustees' representative deeds of trust currently 
hold." Transcript on Appeal, 11. 5 - 8, 14. 
5. "Your Honor, we are not arguing that ACI's lien is destroyed by the ParkWest decision 
by its failure to timely join the trustees. We are only arguing that its mechanic's lien loses 
priority to the legal title that those trustee's hold. i\nd actually, the mechanic's lien is lost 
and unenforceable as to legal title those two trustees currently hold .. .if they convert that 
title be a deed ofreconveyance or a trustee's deed. Subsequently this can be free and 
clear of ACI's mechanic's lien. That's all we are saying. ACI could still continue to 
pursue its subordinate interest in the land if it chooses to do so, but that interest cannot be 
senior to the title that the trustees currently hold pursuant to those deeds of trust." 
Transcript on Appeal, 11. 11 - 24; 20. 
The Memorandum Decision and Order states: 
1. "In this action Third-Party Plaintiff, ACI Northwest, Inc. ("ACI") seeks a determination 
that its claims are senior and take priority over Defendants' Deeds of Trust. Defendants 
have brought this Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that ACI' s mechanic's lien 
does not have priority because ACI failed to include necessary parties in the action, 
namely the trustees of the Defendants' deeds of trust." Memorandum Decision and 
Order, 2 (April 5, 2013); R. page 118. 
2. "This Court finds that because ACI failed to join the trustees who hold legal title to the 
Monument Heights property, as required by I.C. § 45-510 and as construed in the 
Supreme Court ofldaho's recent holding in ParkWest, Defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment." Memorandum Decision and Order, 9 - 10 (April 5, 2013); R. pages 
125 - 126. 
3. "This Court finds that pursuant to LC.§ 45-510 Plaintiff ACI was required to join the 
trustees, the holders of legal title, in its action to judicially foreclose its mechanics liens; 
as a result of ACI's failure to join the hotders of legal title, the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GR.ANTED." Memorandum Decision and Order, 10 (April 5, 
2013); R. page 126. 
4. Later the Court, in its Partial Summary Judgment Against ACI said "Plaintiffs Claim of 
Lien recorded on January 29, 2009 with the Kootenai County Recorder as Instrument No. 
2194504000, is lost and unenforceable against the legal title held by the trustee under the 
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Deed of Trust recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 6, 2008 as 
Instrument 2172582000." Partial Summary Judgment Against ACI, 2 (April 17, 2013); RI 
page 192. 
In the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of 
Trustee's Sale the court states: 
1. "ACI' s liens were lost and unenforceable against the legal title because ACI did not join 
the trustees who held legal title in its action to judicially foreclose its mechanic's lien." 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of 
Trustee's Sale, 4 (June 13, 2013); Record page 230. 
2. "In April 2013 the Court determined that ACI's mechanic's liens were lost and 
unenforceable against the legal title of the subject property because ACI failed to join the 
trustees who hold legal title, so ACI's priority was lost." Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of Trustee's Sale, 5 (June 13, 2013); 
R. page 231. 
The district court's decision is confusing because it attempts to follow a confusing and 
erroneous view of deeds of trust. This Court has the ability to clean up the mess and should 
overrule Long, Defendant A., and ParkWest and start fresh with the statute and the interpretation 
of each respective deed of trust. The deed of trust is used in almost every home loan in Idaho 
and is of such importance that the concept of a deed of trust should be judicially treated as a deed 
of trust, not a mortgage, not a deed, and not a trust. It conveys a right to sell real property that 
secures a debt and nothing more. 
F. Application of the Park West Holding to This Case (the Idea That a 
Subsequent Transfer of the Property Pursuant to the Trust Instrument Will 
Result in the Transferee Taking the Property Free and Clear of ACI's Lien) 
Is at Odds With General Rules of Trust Law and Idaho Statute Because 
A Cl's Mechanics Lien is Superior to the Deeds of Trust as Intruments. 
The general rule of a trustee's sale is that 
the purchaser at a foreclosure sale ... takes subject to valid and operative liens and 
encumbrances which have priority over the mortgage or deed of trust under which 
the foreclosure sale is made [and] [e]xcept under special circumstances, the 
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purchaser at a foreclosure sale under a ... deed of trust takes subject to liens and 
encumbrances which are prior in rank to such ... deed." 
59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 838. Idaho statutes do not vary from this general rule and implicitly 
supports it. For instance, LC. § 45-1507 outlines the priority order of payment to be made out of 
the proceeds of a trustee's sale, beginning with expenses of the sale, then the obligation secured 
by the trust deed, then any junior liens, followed by the grantor of the trust. Idaho statute does 
not conflict with the proposition that property sold at trustee's sale remains encumbered by a lien 
senior to the deed of trust. 
Indeed, this is the same conclusion dravm below by the District Court where it concluded 
that a trustee's sale of the property encumbered by ACI's lien cannot "negatively impact ACI." 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's 
Sale, 6 (June 13, 2013); R. page 232. 
This argument comes from the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's Sale, 6 (June 13, 2013); R. page 232. The Defendants' 
argument, adopted by the court, is that a trustee's sale of the property will not affect ACI's 
interests in the property, whatever they may tum out to be. The judge agreed and stated: "If, on 
appeal, the Court finds that ACI holds senior priority, then ACI will have a valid and operative 
lien against the subject property ... On the other hand, if on appeal, the Court finds [ the J ACI lien 
is junior, then ACI's position will remain the same as it is today." Id. The judge's conclusion 
was based on 59A C.J.S. Mortgages§ 838 and Idaho Code§§ 45-1507 and 1508. 
However, this is not true if ParkWest is followed for the following reason: Today (any 
day before a trustee's sale), according to the Memorandum Decision and Order, ACI may have 
senior claim to the property encumbered by its mechanics lien against all interests, except the 
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power of sale held by the trustees under the deed of trust. Tomorrow (anytime after a trustee's 
sale pursuant to the deed of trust) ACI's lien will have no priority over the land currently 
encumbered under its mechanic's lien. This is so because ParkWest held "that a subsequent 
holder of legal title to property encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien, takes the 
property fi·ee and clear of the mechanic's lien, where the lienor fails to name the trustee of the 
deed of trust in an action to enforce the mechanic's lien within the period of time required by 
statute." ParkWest, 154 Idaho at 685,302 P.3d at 25 (emphasis added). That means that before 
a trustee's sale, ACI can foreclose on the interests of the beneficiaries of the deed of trust 
pursuant to its mechanic's lien, but after a trustee's sale ACI's mechanic's lien has no claim to 
the new purchaser's ownership in the property. This does not sound like a result that "will not 
negatively impact ACI" and ensure that "ACI's position will remain the same as it is today." 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's 
Sale, 6 (June 13, 2013); R. page 232. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ACI respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment below, and award ACI its attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 45-513. 
2reA... 
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